

In Ideology We Trust: Creating Landmarks in American Literature (Part Two)⁴⁰

Mukesh Williams

**More and more does human life depart from the natural rhythms,
the cultures have mingled, and the forms have dissolved into chaos.**

F. R. Leavis, *For Continuity*

In the first part of the paper, published in the previous issue, it was argued that the origins of landmarks in American literary culture was a highly selective process shaped by many factors, but often based on the prevailing ideological, literary and psychological paradigms of the times. The creation of a national literary web in America was, therefore, produced by seven significant ideological concepts per se, namely:

1. writing as historical representation,
2. transforming America as a sacred place,
3. eugenics and fitter families
4. possessing America and William Carlos Williams,
5. changes in literary studies,
6. culture wars or multiculturalism and,
7. the rise of the America Empire and American democracy.

The first four ideological concepts, discussed in Part I, dealt with the formation and concretization of American Literary culture until the end of World War I. Now Part II deals with the conceptual and ideological changes in literary studies after World War I, especially during the 1930s, which significantly altered literary landmarks and redrew the literary map of American literary culture.

5. Changes in Literary Studies

In the 1930s and 1940s American literature had to reckon with many political and literary problems simultaneously. It had to de-link itself from imperial British literature, create its own national landmarks in literature and then establish its truly distinctive identity in the Anglophone world. F. R. Leavis's ideas were central to it. His conservative literary canon defined what was "normally and robustly human" by dismissing writers like E. M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, W. H. Auden and James Joyce as abnormal in one way or the other.⁴¹ Leavis and critics of his conservative literary journal *Scrutiny* were all comfortable in dealing with "native literatures" that originated in different languages from their home ground such as English, French, German, Italian, but not their hybrid colonial forms.⁴² American writing in English was more of a vernacular hard for conservative critics like Leavis to incorporate in *The Great Tradition*.

The influence of Leavis and *Scrutiny* had a baneful effect on the consolidation of American literature as a whole. While American scholars were trying to establish the "essential Americanism" of writers like Henry James, Leavis was trying to do the very opposite. Leavis had his reasons. Though British imperialism had established the dominance of English as the lingua franca of the colonial world, most of the English speakers were "not ethnically English." In the United States, Ireland, Australia, India and the Caribbean, English was a

“foreign literary vernacular” though for *Scrutiny* the United States and Ireland were quite important.⁴³ American literature itself was a nonentity in the 1940s and 1950s. In India the strong influence of English literature and the Leavisian discourse in Indian universities did not allow the dissemination of American literature, except for a few texts by writers like Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, Arthur Miller and Walt Whitman.

During the 1950s the representation of both Afro-American and women writing in American literature was almost negligible. Some graduate schools occasionally introduced minority writers like Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin and women writers like Emily Dickinson to provide a more egalitarian basis for the American canon; but this was not enough.⁴⁴ In the 1960s minority scholars from ethnic backgrounds began to question the narrowness of the American canon and restore “lost, forgotten, or suppressed literary texts” to show the “diversity” that always existed in American literature.⁴⁵ And as Michael Foucault affected the methodology of American literary studies in the 1970s, literary scholarship developed greater awareness towards issues of race, gender and class in the making of literature. Literary anthologies were rather slow to respond to these radical changes in the construction of American literature.

From 1979 to 1982 many American scholars including Paul Lauter of Trinity College met at Yale University under the project “Reconstructing American Literature” supported by The Feminist Press to review both theory and content of American literature. Their efforts published under the title *Reconstructing American Literature* not only provided the English faculty with “models” for changing their courses but also highlighted the “limitations” of existing texts—there were no Latino or Asian-American writers included in anthologies at all.⁴⁶ The restructuring of the American literary project also resulted in the production

of *The Heath Anthology of American Literature* in 1990, which published not only canonical writers but also non-canonical Native American, Black, Asian-American and women writers.⁴⁷ This not only expanded the literary canon but “fundamentally redefine[d]” the literature produced in the United States.⁴⁸ The new scholarship dealing with race, women, minorities and ethnicity energized the classroom and altered the context in which American literature was placed and studied.

6. Culture Wars or Multiculturalism

Feeling the overpowering dominance of white America in the twentieth century, ethnic minorities and women in the 1960s introduced identity politics to gain cultural and political rights for themselves.⁴⁹ Identity politics coincided with the development of Afro-American Studies that focused attention on the socio-economic plight of the Afro-American community. This subsequently gave a new “urgency” to literary studies in America introducing multicultural writing as a new landmark in American literature.⁵⁰ In most cases multiculturalism involved the problem of identity politics, a phenomenon affecting capitalistic societies, something unheard of in peasant communities of the past.⁵¹ In the 1980s and 1990s the canon of American literature was expanded to include ethnic writings of different hyphenated Americans, such as Afro-American, Native Americans, Chicano/a, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans. In other words, ethnic texts competed for literary space with the hitherto white hegemonic texts for recognition.

Right wing liberals such as Robert Bellah, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Michael Sandel and left wing liberals such as Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Michael Walzer have found it rather frustrating to bring together issues raised by multiculturalism and a new democratic ideal. Indeed, central to multiculturalism has been the

notion of otherness that liberals find hard to incorporate within the notion of either an assimilationist ethic or more significantly American solidarity.⁵² Though the strong appeal of liberalism weakened by the early 1990s it still remains “a historical modality, a way of life” in which we may construct our “political existence” and enjoy our rights and liberty. However the problem of American liberalism lies in the way it constructs the other or the enemy, its role as a heroic global protector of liberal siblings, and its potential to deploy an awesome military force.⁵³ These are challenges that not only liberalism but America must resolve.

It is an undeniable fact that American society has become fragmented “by ethnicity, class and gender” and this society would undoubtedly disintegrate without the twin values of “cultural tolerance” and cultural understanding.” America faces the challenge of building a common “public culture” and responding to the “long-silenced cultures of color.” Gates, Jr., emphatically concludes: “If we relinquish the ideal of America as a plural nation, we’ve abandoned the very experiment that American represents.”⁵⁴

7. The Rise of the American Empire and American Democracy

Multiculturalism or ‘culture wars’ as it was called then has been replaced in recent years by war on terror. Since the 1990s evident notions of American supremacy in world affairs has made the word ‘empire’ together with the phrase ‘homeland security’ more acceptable, contradicting the metaphors of melting pot and boundless mobility in the rich tapestry of American democracy.⁵⁵ The new emphasis on the term “empire” brings into focus the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the violence of subsequent American overseas possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific Empire. It also redefines the twin ideas of territorial expansionism and American imperialism long-separated and decentered in the

context of US democracy. Though recent centrist and revisionist studies of the empire see American exceptionalism as distinct from European imperialism of the nineteenth century, they still see globalization as a decentered form of American empire.⁵⁶ The process of remapping and redefining the term 'empire' has given rise to new field of studies called 'empire studies' that by revising and redefining American studies and allied disciplines is trying to institutionalize the term empire.⁵⁷

America has always been an "empire in denial" that "dare not speak its name" and this denial has been the ideological cornerstone of American imperialism and an important aspect of American exceptionalism.⁵⁸ When Henry Luce in 1941 coined the phrase the American Century he was in effect denying the geographical spread of America as an empire by claiming a temporal identity. He saw the American Century as the inevitable destiny, a natural consequence of certain historical forces of progress and change.⁵⁹ The growth of American power is directly linked to the structures of imperialism, capitalism and modernity. David Harvey sees the growth of American power from 1870-1945 as the strengthening of "bourgeois imperialism" while that from 1945-1970 as the growth of "postwar American hegemony."⁶⁰ This creates an uneven history of American political and economic interests vis-à-vis Europe, Asia and Africa. For Harvey there is no easy accord between the "politics of state and empire" and the "molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time."⁶¹ The masking of the notions of an empire through the rhetoric of democracy Harvey calls an abstract universalism.⁶²

American scholars no longer see the notion of the American Empire as just a "left-wing polemic." It is an assertive imperial identity of the neo-conservatives celebrating American manifest destiny on a global scale, declaring a war against

terror, against the Muslim world in self-righteous terms. “America’s entire war on terror,” writes Michael Ignatieff, “is an exercise in imperialism. This may come as a shock to Americans, who don’t like to think of their country as an empire. But what else can you call America’s legions of soldiers, spooks, and special forces straddling the globe?”⁶³ Even if the term empire might seem elusive within America it is impossible to ignore the frightening growth of American “empire of bases” in the world as Chalmers Johnson argues in *The Sorrows of Empire*.⁶⁴ Critics believe that the Bush imperialists and the Bush administration have given a new twist to the term neo-imperialism by taking over the functions of imperial governance through its tactics of “stealth, politesse, and obliquity.”⁶⁵ Amy Kaplan sees this new American narrative encompassing the perennial notions of time and space as the immortality and global invincibility of the empire.⁶⁶ Now within the discipline of American Studies scholars feel a sense of urgency to expose the “racism of empire” and understand the method by which the Arabs and Islam are “racialized” within the U.S. and outside in places like Guantanamo and Abu Gharib detention centers.⁶⁷

Today, when the ideology of the empire once more reconfigures American cultural and literary landscape it is important to hold up to the U.S. “its own professed ideals.”⁶⁸ America has always been a pluralistic society right from its conception. The national motto of the United States embodied in the Latin phrase *e pluribus unam* (out of many one) adopted in 1776 not only refers to the unification of the 13 independent colonies but also the pluralistic nature of America both through colonization and immigration. To claim a new identity of America as an aggressive imperialist abroad and a champion of democratic values within would be hard to endorse. Kaplan rightly argues that “judging American actions by its own ideal standards” not only has a long-standing history but also can have a devastating effect. As Mark Twain once argued in “To

the Person Sitting in Darkness” that there has to be two Americas—one that frees and another that enslaves and dispossesses.⁶⁹

The condemnation in the United States of torture inside Abu Gharib prison was also an expression of betrayed American ideals. If American ideals can go beyond the concepts of nationhood and encompass transnational and global notions of human rights, international law and universal ethics then this can rejuvenate American studies and American literature per se. And this after all should be the immediate goal of Americanists and American studies scholars at a time when civil liberties are under duress.

NOTES

- 40 This paper was originally presented at the MELUS International Conference at the English Auditorium, University of Chandigarh, India on March 28, 2005. The theme of the conference was “Landmarks on the American Scene—Then and Now;” and this paper was then titled “Space as Landmark in American Literature.” The present paper is a somewhat revised version of the original presentation.
- 41 *Scrutiny*, Volume 7, Number 2 (September 1938) and Volume 13 Number 2 (September 1945). Also see “Joyce and ‘the revolution of the word.’” *Scrutiny*, Volume 2, Number 2 (September 1933), pp. 193-201. Also see Francis Mulhern, “English reading,” *ibid.*, pgs. 258 and 260.
- 42 F. R. Leavis, *For Continuity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), Leavis qualified his criticism of Spengler by observing that, “More and more does human life depart from the natural rhythms, the cultures have mingled, and the forms have dissolved into chaos” p. 139. Mulhern believes that this was an attempt by Leavis to restore “integrity and order in the English national culture.” See Mulhern, “English reading,” *ibid.*, p. 260.
- 43 Francis Mulhern, “English reading,” in *Nation and Narration*, Homi K. Bhabha ed. rpt. 2000, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 260. Mulhern supports his claims that Marius Bewley tried to show the “essential Americanism” of Henry James by pointing out that the novel begins in Jane Austen and returns to England in the person of Henry James—the American line of the Great tradition. F. R. Leavis had already rejected James Joyce as a product of colonial Ireland who wrote in the mother language as another language. Leavis was favorable to James and Conrad for their Englishness and not for their foreignness. To see English writing in America as part of the Great Tradition and admit its Americanness would

have been quite paradoxical for Leavis.

- 44 Paul Lauter, "Preface to the First Edition," in *The Heath Anthology of American Literature*, Volume I, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1994), p. xxx.
- 45 Paul Lauter, "Preface to the First Edition," in *The Heath Anthology*, *ibid.*, p. xxxi.
- 46 Paul Lauter, "Preface to the First Edition," in *The Heath Anthology* *ibid.*, p. xxxi. Also see *Reconstructing American Literature*, (Old Westbury: Feminist Press, 1983).
- 47 Along with canonical works from antebellum fiction writers like Poe, Hawthorne and Melville but also non canonical works by prose writers like William Wells Brown, Alice Cary, Rebecca Harding Davis, Caroline Kirkland, Harriet Prescott Stoddard, Elizabeth Drew Stoddard and Harriet Wilson apart from many others were also published.
- 48 Paul Lauter, "Preface to the First Edition," in *The Heath Anthology* *ibid.*, p. xxxii.
- 49 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., sums up the controversy underlying multiculturalism thus: "Ours is a late-twentieth-century world profoundly fissured by nationality, ethnicity, race, class, and gender. And the only way to transcend those divisions—to forge, for once, a civic culture that respects both differences and commonalties—is thought education that seeks to comprehend the diversity of human culture. Beyond the hype and the high-flown rhetoric is a pretty homely truth: There is no tolerance without respect—and no respect without knowledge. Any human being sufficiently curious and motivated can fully possess another culture, no matter how 'alien' it may appear to be." Gates, Jr., believes ours is a multicultural world and Afro-American writers sensitive to this new development have already "blended forms of Western literature and African-American vernacular and written traditions." This "cultural impulse" can revitalize American culture in the new century. It is an undeniable fact that American society has become fragmented "by ethnicity, class and gender" and this society would undoubtedly disintegrate without the twin values of "cultural tolerance" and cultural understanding." America faces the challenge of building a common "public culture" and responding to the "long-silenced cultures of color." Gates, Jr., emphatically concludes: "If we relinquish the ideal of America as a plural nation, we've abandoned the very experiment that American represents." See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., *Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. xv-xvii and 176.
- 50 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., *Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. xiii. Multiculturalism may be defined as the existence and occasionally the coexistence of diverse interdisciplinary practices to identify, understand, and separate cultural uniqueness of ethnic and marginalized or non-ethnic or dominant groups.
- 51 Capitalism, as Marx pointed out in his *Manifesto*, gives rise to a highly developed economic society, forcibly bringing nations and groups together through slave trade, white settlements and Third World immigrant workers. In such situations as Alex Callinicos points out, "identity becomes an issue." But together with the formation of identities the process of assimilation also starts giving rise to "eclectic cultures." See Alex Callinicos, *Theories and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Polity Press,

1995), p. 200.

- 52 A recent sociological study by John J. Miller argued that multiculturalism has prevented the Americanization of immigrants. Miller, vice president of the Center for Equal Opportunity in Washington, sees the multicultural agenda responsible for this. Since the ideology campaigns for affirmative action and bilingual education in public schools in order to preserve its cultural heritage it finds the idea of Americanization somewhat disturbing. Miller's strongly conservative position, flaunted as liberal, makes him see multiculturalists as "global village people" and prompts him to link them with gay and Communists with the phrase "fellow travelers." Therefore Miller advocates for a return to the coercive process of Americanization that prevailed at the turn of the 20th century in public policy issues. John J. Miller, *The Unmaking of America: How Multiculturalism has Undermined the Assimilation Ethic*, (New York: Free Press, 1998). Multiculturalism also faces the problem of ideological positioning in a post-communist world mythologized by the supposed triumph of the free world. Western liberalism still remains an intellectually viable proposition despite its failures in Vietnam and Guatemala, "stemming from," what Robert Latham calls "its overzealousness and its greed due to its grounding in capitalism." See Robert Latham, Liberalism's Order/Liberalism's Other: A Genealogy of Threat," *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan-Mar), 1995, p.111.
- 53 Latham, *ibid*. Liberal heroes have entered into global struggles arguing that they wish to protect their liberal brothers but remain "committed" to military power. "Upon whom this might be turned and for what reasons remains a crucial question." Latham concludes: "To move beyond the positioning of liberalism as the master referent of post-Cold War change, at a minimum the myth of liberal heroism will need to be abandoned." pp. 111-2.
- 54 Gates Jr., *Loose Canons*, p. 176. A somewhat recent book by Alex Callinicos, *Theories and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History*, deals with the changing relationship between social theories and historical narratives. Callinicos argues that social theory can effectively contribute to our better understanding of the past. To this end he analyses the ideas of Francis Fukuyama's Hegelian conceptualization of history, to Hayden White's postmodernist attempts to visualize past through human representation. In the book he attacks a Eurocentric theory of history wondering "how a critique of oppression can proceed except on a nonrelativist basis." He takes up Rorty's argument and bends it to suit his purpose. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 191. Callinicos employs the Rortian rhetoric that moral and political action is not based on "some universalistic notion of moral autonomy or human rights but the narrower solidarities which emerge in specific historically contingent circumstances."⁵³ Though Callinicos accepts Rorty's idea that our construction of "us" is more localized than universal, Callinicos finds it hard to believe that Rorty can question the humanistic basis of man's generosity to others. Nevertheless, Callinicos's objection to Rorty's argument is more fundamental. He wants to know: "Who are the we shared membership of which is to the basis of moral and political action? Solidarities 'smaller and more local than the human

race' necessarily exclude as well as include. The politically effective 'we' in the antebellum American South excluded slave. Abolitionists challenging the 'peculiar institution' appealed, among other things, to the very fact that black slaves were as much human beings as free whites. Looking back, we condemn various historically constituted solidarities as too narrow, in an ethically relevant sense—classical Athens, for example, for excluding women, slaves and metrics from the 'we' of free citizens. But how is this condemnation to be grounded?" See Callinicos, *ibid.*, p. 197. The ongoing controversy about multiculturalism can best be exemplified by the publication of two books and their varied reception in America. The first is Todd Gitlin's *The Twilight of Common Dreams* (New York: Henry Holt and Company Inc., 1995) and the second David Hollinger's *Postethnic America*, (Basic Books 1995) Gitlin's book provides a rich historical and psychological analysis of American culture, leading to the clash of cultures in contemporary America. However his strongly leftist and highly confrontationist position has met with strong reactions from multicultural critics furthering their brand of aggressive political identity. Hollinger's is a more balanced and well-argued work on multiculturalism that looks beyond the present controversy proposing ways to circumvent it. However, both agree that the inherent contradiction in multiculturalism is responsible for its dismal failure. Multiculturalism, they believe, lacks the ability to balance singular cultural difference with universal cultural unity. After all multiculturalism ultimately ought to exist within the framework of social solidarity and must contribute to social unity. And therefore, both authors critique the notion of multicultural alterity standing against the idea of cultural togetherness. Since a multicultural identity underscores cultural difference it puts on hold the notion of human solidarity, making it look somewhat suspect. Moreover its emphasis on legitimating and empowering identity makes it see the notion of human solidarity as a plea for ethnocentrism.

- 55 Amy Kaplan, "Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, October 17, 2003," in *American Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2004) Kaplan writes: "A nation of immigrants, a melting pot, the western frontier, manifest destiny, a classless society—all involve metaphors of spatial mobility rather than the spatial fixedness and rootedness that homeland implies.... How many U.S. citizens see themselves as members of a diasporic community with a homeland in Ireland, Africa, Israel, or Palestine—a place to which they feel spiritual or political affiliation and belonging, whether literally a place of birth or not? Does the idea of America as the homeland make such dual identifications suspect and threatening, something akin to terrorism? Are you either a member of the homeland or with the terrorists, to paraphrase Bush? And what of the terrible irony of the United States as a homeland to Native Americans?" (pp. 8-9). The neo-conservative belief of democratizing the world has been attacked from within the western world by the discipline of anthropology. Clifford Geertz believes that man does not possess universal nature but universal potential that are realized in specific situations. Since he does not possess a composite universal nature it becomes difficult to appeal to a collective ethical core in moments of crisis. We constantly see scapegoats in others and, symbolically

or literally, sacrifice them in the hope of eventually exorcising our own phobias, guilt-ridden fantasies and vices. Kenneth Burke, who sees a process of “vicarious atonement” at work here, has analyzed this process of exteriorization and symbolic renewal at length. Burke believes that the scapegoat becomes a “chosen vessel” that is employed by others to “cleanse themselves” by heaping the “burden of their iniquities” on it. The violent intensity with which the ritual of displacement is conducted decides the “curative” power of the scapegoat. The victim and the residual violence become not only instrumental in restoring individual and social healing but fusing with each other in a symbiosis. In other words we first project our guilt, mortification and inadequacy on a person then we malign and ostracize him. In this manner we regain health and well-being. This complex process of identity formation works in the following manner: first to malign difference, then to elevate it to the level of a religious sacrifice, and then feel empowered. Can we escape this process of conceptualization? Is there a way out? Burke suggests that identity may be constructed not in terms of solidarity but in terms of a “fundamental kinship with the enemy,” someone against whom we define ourselves. Self and other can stand facing each other like prismatic mirrors refracting unseen aspects of each other. Even while we are constructing a sense of difference we are inextricably intertwined, sharing somewhat similar histories, undergoing not altogether divergent fates. Burke goes further to suggest that aspects of the self may be seen as aspects of the other and vice versa. This implies in Derrida’s logic to understand and appreciate the ways in which the “other” constructs itself as different aspects of the ego or “I.” Also see Susan Gillman, *The New, Newest Thing: Have American Studies Gone Imperial?* *American Literary History*, Vol. 17, No.1, 2005, pp. 196-7.

- 56 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, (2000), pp. 14-15. Also see Walter LeFeber, *The New Empire* (1963) that gives a revisionist account of the Spanish-American War,
- 57 See Susan Gillman, *The New, Newest Thing: Have American Studies Gone Imperial?* *American Literary History*, *ibid.* p. 198. Gillman writes, “The point is that field called empire studies, drawing on the same history of additions and revisions to other, allied disciplines, is now in the process of institutionalization.”
- 58 Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 370. Ferguson’s revisionist history of the British Empire rebukes America for its denial of empire and exhorts it to take the mantle of the white man’s burden (pgs 54 and 370). Also see Amy Kaplan, “Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, October 17, 2003,” in *American Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2004), p. 3.
- 59 See Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Smith argues, Whereas the geographical language of empires suggest a malleable politics—empires rise and fall and are open to challenge—the ‘American Century’ suggests an inevitable destiny...How does one challenge a century? US historical dominance was presented as the natural result of historical progress...It followed as surely as one century after another. Insofar as it was

- beyond geography, the American Century was beyond empire and beyond reproof.” (p. 20).
- 60 David Harvey, *New Imperialism*, (London: OUP, 2003), pp.42-49).
- 61 Harvey, *New Imperialism*, *ibid*, p. 26.
- 62 Harvey, *New Imperialism*, *ibid*, pp. 47-50.
- 63 Michael Ignatieff, “The Burden,” *The New York Times Magazine*, 5 January 2003, pp. 22-54.
- 64 Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, (New York: Metropolitan, 2003)
- 65 See Joshua Micah Marshall, “Power Rangers,” *New Yorker*, 2 February 2004, pp. 83-88.
- 66 See Kaplan, “Violent Beginnings,” *ibid* p. 4. J. M. Coetzee maintains that empires always fear their own demise—One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era.” See J. M. Coetzee, *Waiting for the Barbarians*, (New York: Penguin, 1982), p. 31.
- 67 Amy Kaplan, “Violent Beginnings,” *ibid.*, pgs. 5 and 12-16.
- 68 Amy Kaplan, “A Call for a Truce,” *American Literary History*, Volume 17, No. 1, (2005), p. 144.
- 69 Mark Twain, “To the Person Sitting in Darkness.” 1910. In *Mark Twain’s Weapons of Satire: Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-American War*, ed. Jim Zwick, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992). Twain writes that, “There must be two Americas: one that sets the captive free, and one that takes a once-captive’s new freedom away from him, and picks a quarrel with him with nothing to found it on; then kill him to get his land” (pp. 33-34).