"Positive Pacifism" and the Development of Japan's PKO Policy*

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Introduction

Ever since Japan attained membership of the United Nations in 1956, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has had an aspiration to dispatch its Self Defense Forces (SDF) to UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Yet, postwar anti-militarism caused by the traumatic horror and devastation after the Second World War and constitutional pacifism based on Article 9 of the Japanese constitution which stipulates the renunciation of war and non-possession of armed forces had prevented SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

The 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis became a decisive catalyst for Japan's PKO policy and the Japanese government created the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in 1992 and later in the same year, dispatched the SDF to UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.
Since then, Japan's UN peacekeeping participation has been gradually recognized. Other international stimuli to Japan's UN peacekeeping participation and further contribution to Afghanistan and Iraq had been official UN documents such as An Agenda for Peace proposed by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, and the Brahimi Report announced in 2000.

It has been 20 years since the enactment of the 1992 PKO Law which legitimized Japan's participation in UNPKO, and theoretical and empirical re-examination is meaningful in considering the current and future Japan's foreign and security policies. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to contextualize the development of Japan's PKO policy and clarify the several factors and motivations of Japan's contribution to UNPKO from the orthodox theories of international relations. It also attempts to scrutinize applicability of the peace research theory (negative-positive peace) to the study of Japan's PKO policy. To this end, the paper begins with an overview on Japan's security policy and constitutional pacifism that constrained Japan's participation in UNPKO throughout the Cold War period.

Japan’s Constitutional Pacifism and Anti-Militarism

The importance of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has been internationally recognized as a peace clause. On 11 May 1999, the Hague Appeal for Peace Civil Society Conference was held and ten fundamental principles for a just world order were proposed. As the first principle among them, Article 9 was raised stating, "All the parliaments shall introduce an article that prohibits their governments from going to war, like Article 9 of the Japanese constitution (HAP, 2005)." Johan Galung, one of the pioneers of modern peace research,
argued that he regarded the peace constitution (Japanese constitution) as an asset rather than a liability for Japan (Galtung and Ikeda, 1995: 32). Overestimation of the Japanese constitution, especially Article 9 has been often criticized as utopianism. Still, the Japanese constitution with its uniqueness of three basic principles of popular sovereignty, pacifism, and human rights (Hamano, 1999: 19-20), can be seen as an asset not only for Japan but also for all the countries in the world.

One of the most influential norms of Japan's foreign, security, and defense policies after the Pacific War has been constitutional pacifism as anti-militarism (Dobson, 2003: 34). While Western anti-militarism is rooted in the tradition of Christianity, Japan's antimilitarism is based on the devastation by the firebombing on Tokyo and the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War (Dobson, 2003: 35-36). As Galtung observed, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has various interpretations. It can be regarded as an absolute pacifism. In other words, it is possible to interpret that it describes a rejection not only of war but also of the instruments of war including the SDF (Galtung and Ikeda, 1995: 32). The Preamble of Japan's 1947 constitution suggests that Japan desires not only domestic peace but also that of other countries all over the world with policies of renunciation of war and non-armament policy. The Preamble of the Japanese constitution states as follows:

The Preamble of the Japanese Constitution

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determine that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited by the
horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone but that laws of political morality are universal, and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

(National Diet Library)

Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of the Japanese constitution describes that the Japanese people desire peace and justice. Paragraph 3 clarifies that not only the Japanese people but also all other people in the world commonly deserve peace, free from fear and want. Hoshino termed the right in Paragraph 3 as the right to peaceful coexistence (Hoshino, 2004: 4). On the other hand, Paragraph 2 can be
regarded as international pacifism identical to the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, UN Charter). The Preamble of the Japanese constitution can be regarded as a proclamation of international pacifism and peaceful coexistence right.

**Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution**

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.

The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

(National Diet Library)

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 clearly stipulates renunciation of war just like Article 2 of Paragraph 4 in the UN Charter prohibits the use of force (United Nations, UN Charter). Meanwhile, absolute pacifism based on Paragraph 2 of Article 9 has been practically invalidated. It describes that Japan cannot possess any war potential in order to achieve the goal of Paragraph 1. In short, Article 9 prescribes the renunciation of war and non-armament policy.

As Hoshino, Furukawa, Morita and Watanabe contended, it can be emphasized that Article 9 as a peace clause and the Japanese constitution as a peace constitution did not emerge all of a sudden without context. They represent accumulated efforts for the illegalization of war in human history (Hoshino, 2004: Preface). Indeed, the Preamble and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution have some similarities with the Charter of the United Nations especially in terms
of the illegalization of war and international pacifism.

In order to clarify the significance of Article 9 and the Preamble of the Japanese constitution, I would like to conceptualize them from the perspective of theory of peace research proposed by Johan Galtung. Galtung divided the definition of peace into "negative peace" and "positive peace". Negative peace simply means the absence of direct violence such as war and conflict. On the other hand, positive peace is defined as the absence of so-called structural violence (indirect violence) such as poverty, economical inequity, economical exploitation, social repression, social discrimination, etc (Barash and Webel, 2002: 6).

Galtung also defined peace as the nonviolent and creative conflict transformation, as well as the absence/reduction of all kinds of violence (Galtung, 1996: 9). As for the definition of positive peace as absence of structural violence suggested by Galtung, Toshihiko Nishiyama criticized that the absence of structural violence is not sufficient for real positive peace. Nishiyama on the contrary argued that positive peace needs to be a state of satisfaction of human potentiality rather than a state of zero-violence (Nishiyama, 2003: 108). In response to criticism from Nishiyama, Galtung agreed with his argument that positive peace requires the presence of conditions for peace (Galtung, 2003: 118).

In this sense, the renunciation of war and non-armament policy described in Article 9 can be categorized as negative peace. On the other hand, international pacifism and peaceful coexistence right described in the Preamble of the Japanese constitution can be classified as positive peace. Especially, the concept of peaceful coexistence right is a condition for positive peace. In short, it can be argued that the Japanese constitution desires not only negative peace
but also positive peace as promise and purpose of Japan's foreign policies.

Japan's Remilitarization: "From Swords to Plowshares and Back"

After the Second World War, the Japanese government based on Article 9 of the Japanese constitution declared that Japan shall not possess any military power so that war can not be waged. Since 1945, the government had followed its own non-armament and non-war policy. However, in the context of the Cold War, Japan was pressured to be rearmed in order to form a global alliance against communism. Japan's disarmament and rearmament were described as "from swords to plowshares and back" (Berger, 1998: 33).

In particular, the Korean War (1950-1953) was a turning-point for Japan's policy for remilitarization. In the same year as the outbreak of the Korean War, the Japanese government established the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai) under the pressure from the United States to fill the power vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of the US troops. In 1952, the government reorganized the National Police Reserve as the National Security Force (Hoantai). After these rearmament steps, the SDF (Jieitai) was eventually established in 1954 with the purpose of defending Japan from external attack (Maswood, 1990: 28).

The SDF is composed of three services: Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces (respectively the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF). The equipment of the SDF is made up of the most modern weapons systems. For instance, the GSDF has deployed the Patriot missile defense system, the MSDF possesses Aegis-class destroyers, and the ASDF possesses some 175 F-15s. On top of the US nuclear protection,
the SDF has been trained in joint military exercises with US army. Although the use of weapons of the SDF is basically limited to protection of the Japanese territory, its military potential should be regarded as one of the strongest in East Asia (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya, 1999: 87).

Japan's defense policy is known for its commitment to keep defense expenditure under 1% of GNP (Katzenstein, 1996: 124). The SDF had existed not for collective defense, but only for self-defense until 1992. The Japanese government has explained that Article 9 did not deny a self-defense right of Japan. There is no description regarding self-defense in Article 9, however. Hence, the identity and existence of the SDF are seemingly contradictory in terms of Article 9.

**Interpretation of Article 9 and Japan's Security Policy**

The peace constitution was created after the scourge of the two world wars and the peace clause was invented in the context of historical efforts to make war illegal. The legalization of war can be seen in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the United Nations Charter of 1945. By using peace doctrine and disarmament, the United States tried to show the world that Japan would never be rearmed and threaten other countries especially Asian states. The so-called "MacArthur note" of 1946 was a draft for the new Japanese constitution and after some revisions, it became the current constitution. The Japanese government and the conservatives agreed to the peaceful constitution to preserve the emperor system and the Japanese public also welcomed the new principle (Okubo, 1997: 102, 103).

At the stage of the MacArthur note, Japan was supposed to renounce even the right of self-defense (National Diet Library) because
Japan and other countries had waged wars under the name of self-defense. Through the process of deliberation especially the Ashida revision however, the peace clause was created not to illegalize self-defensive war but to prohibit act of aggression and the rearmament of Japan. Therefore, land, sea, and air forces for self-defense are not unconstitutional according to the interpretation of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. The Japanese government justified the existence of the SDF by explaining that the minimum level of self-defense power was necessary to deter aggression or illegal attack from abroad. The government interpreted that the SDF was not same as "war potential" as described in the second paragraph of Article 9 because it was not for aggression but only for self-defense (Okubo, 1997: 103, 104).

Although the Japanese government succeeded in establishing the SDF, it had been technically difficult for the SDF to participate in UN peace operations. Article 98 of the Japanese constitution can be regarded as a legal loophole for Japan's security policy. While Paragraph 1 of Article 98 provides that the Japanese constitution shall be "the supreme law of the nation," Paragraph 2 of the article requires the Japanese government to observe all international laws regardless of their source (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya, 1999: 46-47). As a result, the Japanese government can regard Article 9 of the Japanese constitution as the most important legal base and at the same time the UN Charter, especially Article 42 and 51 (collective security and self-defense) also can be the first priority of the legal base. Furthermore, Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the UN Charter states that UN member states shall give the United Nations any assistance in any action in accordance with the present Charter (Ibid, 1999: 49). Nevertheless, a new legal framework was necessary to dispatch the
SDF to UNPKO in order to persuade the Japanese pacifists who did not wish Japan to be involved in international conflicts.

Japan's anti-militarist and the Kyoto school's interpretation of the 1947 constitution has been always the same and they insist that the constitution, especially Article 9 should not be changed by particular politicians in power at that time. The historical, psychological, and constitutional anti-militarism was of course incompatible with Japan's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations (Dobson, 2003: 35-37). By and large, although these constitutional pacifism and postwar anti-militarism contributed to Japan's unique national identity and economic prosperity, the anti-militarist pacifism was a hindrance for Japan's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

The 1991 Gulf War and the Evolution of Japan's PKO Policy

Historically, Japan had adopted a seclusion policy (sakoku) from 1639 to 1868. Even after Japan began to normalize its diplomacy, this sakoku mentality remained (Ito, 1998: 13). Since 1956, the year when Japan obtained a membership of the United Nations, Japan had carefully chosen not to get involved in a peacekeeping operation of the United Nations (Owada, 1995: 106). In fact, when the United Nations requested the Japanese government to dispatch the SDF to Lebanon in 1958, the government flatly turned it down. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted the UN Resolutions Cooperation Bill in 1965, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution to impose economic sanctions against Rhodesia. However, the bill was not handed to the Diet on account of the strong domestic opposition (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993: 160). This reluctance towards military contribution had been on account of postwar anti-militarism and constitutional pacifism
based on Article 9 prevailing among the Japanese people.

The two oil crises of 1973 and 1980 triggered by the fourth Arab-Israeli War and the Iran-Iraq War negatively influenced the Japanese economy but did not bring about Japan's psychological shift towards peacekeeping participation. The Gulf Crisis of 1990 was, however, different and like a "bolt out of the blue" for the Japanese government (Inoguchi, 1993: 98). This Gulf shock became the direct cause for the Japanese government to reconsider its traditional non-military diplomacy.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, US President George Bush Sr. pressured Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (1989-1994) to participate in minesweeping and other logistical support in the war. Yet, Prime Minister Kaifu showed reluctance to accede to this request given Japan's constitutional restrictions (Ishizuka, 2005: 68). Prime Minister Kaifu stated there would be no need to send the SDF overseas and the government first decided to donate $1 billion to the multinational forces. An additional $3 billion of financial assistance was donated on 14 September. Contrary to the reluctance of the prime minister, Ichiro Ozawa, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary General, made efforts to draft a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in a way that the SDF could be dispatched overseas (Okubo, 1997: 98).

Nevertheless, the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill eventually ended up failing to pass the Diet. It was no surprise that the bill was rejected, because the Japanese public was extremely cautious about LDP's plan to dispatch the SDF overseas. After the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill was rejected, the LDP, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) agreed to a "three-party accord" to introduce a new legal framework for PKO participation. Ichiro Ozawa of the LDP, Yuichi Ichikawa of the Komeito and Takashi Yonezawa of
the DSP signed the accord which stated that UNPKO could be a central part of Japan's diplomacy (Dobson 2003: 69-70).

In addition to the $4 billion donation for the UN coalition forces, the Kaifu administration contributed $9 billion to balance the burden with other contributing countries. This decision the government made was criticized on the grounds that it violated the financial principles of the constitution that specifically forbid the Japanese government's contribution of war funds (Okubo, 1997: 98). Although Japan donated as much as $13 billion for the multinational forces in total, its financial policy was criticized as "non-bloodshed" policy. Former US Secretary of State James Baker explicitly criticized Japanese diplomacy as too narrow in his speech to the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo in November 1991 (Ishizuka, 2005: 68). In response to the international criticism, the Japanese government and some Japanese public became aware that Japan should more proactively get involved in the maintenance of international peace and security (Ibid).

In this context, the International Peace Cooperation Bill (the PKO Bill) was presented to the Diet in September 1991 including the so-called "Five Principles" for the participation for a Japanese contingent in peacekeeping operations. The "Five Principles" were demanded by the DSP and the Komeito as conditions for PKO participation so that Japan would not contravene Article 9 (Dobson 2003: 72). The reason why the Japanese government incorporated the Five Principles was in order to acquire the approval of the two opposition parties (Inoguchi, 1993: 100). The Komeito stated that the Five Principles were necessary as a guarantee of civilian control. The Ozawa Committee cited its Preamble of the constitution and stressed that the spirit of the Japan's constitution was for international cooperation. The Committee also mentioned the fact that PKO
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 (Dobson, 2003: 73). With regard to the use of force or self-defense, the PKO Bill limited it only for legitimate self-defense to protect the Japanese personnel's lives "present with them on the spot" (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya, 1999: 63).

Participation in the Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) such as the patrolling of buffer zones and the disposal of abandoned weapons was frozen because the LDP made a compromise with the Komeito and the DSP so as to pass the PKO Bill smoothly. Originally, the opposition parties such as the DSP and the Komeito demanded the establishment of a separate organization from the SDF for Japan's peacekeeping participation (Ishizuka, 2005: 69). Nonetheless, the idea of a separate organization for PKO participation was dismissed on the grounds that the SDF was much more effective and there were administrative and funding problems. Instead, the government decided to adopt the Five Principles prepared by the Komeito. In this context, the PKO Bill was voted into law on 19 June 1992 after a stormy debate and resistance by the opposition parties (Ibid).

The PKO Law stipulates that the Japanese peacekeepers should help with observing and supervising elections and ensuring fair balloting, providing bureaucratic advice and guidance, such as police administration, medical care, transportation, communications and construction work, as well as humanitarian work including refugee rescue. The PKO Law influenced by domestic anti-militarism banned participation in the monitoring of ceasefires, stationing troops, patrolling demilitarized zones, controlling the influx of weapons, collecting, storing and disposing of abandoned weapons, assisting disputants in settling borders, and assisting with the exchange of prisoners of war. Thus the second bill seemed successful as a way to persuade and compromise with domestic anti-militarist norms (Hook,
These processes of Japan's security policy shift to UNPKO participation indicate the strength and complexity of Japanese people's anti-militarism and constitutional pacifism.

From the Perspective of Realism: Factors in Japan's Policy Shift

The orthodox theories of international relations provide several explanations for Japan's participation in UNPKO. First, a realist perspective supports Japan's motivations for participating in UNPKO. As mentioned above, Japanese realists felt humiliated that the Kuwait government explicitly omitted Japan from its public declaration of gratitude after the Gulf War despite the fact that Japan totally donated no less than $13 billion as financial assistance. The Gulf War experience aroused Japan's ambition for power and prestige in the international community with a realistic recognition. Japanese realist perspectives value the Japan-US alliance system. This view has always tried to meet the Western demands so that Japan can commit to economical development and reduce its security expenditure. While the realist paradigm regarded PKO as the lower security method, the realists also made use of PKO policy for Japan's progress in status in the international system (Dobson, 2003: 9-10).

There was strong external pressure on the Japanese government from the US Congress on 3 August, 1990. As a matter of fact, there was a personal phone call from US President Bush to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu on 4 August demanding Japan's cooperation for the US-led multinational forces (Ueki, 1993: 357). The external pressure, particularly from the United States made Prime Minister Kaifu support the SDF participation including collective security operations forbidden by Article 9, although he swiftly backed away the latter
owing to strong anti-militarist opposition (Ueki, 1993: 360). More concisely, Japan's series of peacekeeping operations could be interpreted as nothing more than Japan's effort to pass a test of "alliance loyalty" proposed by the United States (Searle and Kamae, 2004: 467).

A realist perspective explains the reason of the Japanese psychological shift was due to its ambition for a political power in the world with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. From the realistic perspective, the external factors, especially the US pressure and Japan's ambition to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council were major reasons for the policy shift. In July 1994, a resolution passed by the US Senate stated that they would not support Japan's bid for a permanent Security Council seat if it did not live up to a full commitment to a peacekeeping operation. Likewise, Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative to UNTAC, stated that if Japan wishes to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it would be necessary to take a new responsibility for ensuring international peace and security (Ishizuka, 2005: 71). Indeed, permanent membership on the UN Security Council has several political benefits, especially the so-called veto power. Permanent members can veto UN actions or resolutions which are harmful to their own political and strategic interests so that they can remain the top key posts. Although their influence on international politics is not necessarily absolute, permanent membership is a symbol of political influence and power (Ueki, 1993: 365).

In short, from the viewpoint of realism, external factors, external pressure such as the international criticism after the Gulf Crisis and the pressure from the United States can be raised as reasons for Japan's drastic policy shift. As well as external pressure, internal factors,
including Japan's ambition to attain permanent membership on the UN Security Council in order to take leadership and increase political influence can be the understandable reasons for participation in UNPKO.

From the Perspectives of Idealism and Internationalism

Japan's policy shift towards UNPKO also can be expounded in terms of the idealist viewpoints. While realism emphasizes national interests, idealism and internationalism value international cooperation among countries based on humanitarian reasons with expectation to the UN system.

First of all, the idealist and internationalist viewpoints consider the peace operations of the United Nations essential. Although collective security system described in the UN Charter did not work properly because of the ideological confrontation in the Cold War, the peacekeeping operations have steadily made contributions to international peace and security (Saito, 1993: 99-100). In the post-Cold War world, regional conflicts have become more frequent and international peace operations and preventive diplomacy became significant in the conflict-resolution mechanism (Morimoto, 2004: 79-80). As former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested in his proposal, *An Agenda for Peace*, peacekeeping operations as well as peace-building and preventive diplomacy are considered to be increasingly important in the UN-led international conflict resolution (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

After the establishment of the PKO Law, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Tokyo and encouraged further participation in UN operations within the framework of the Japanese
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constitution (Ishizuka, 2005: 70). With this expectation on the UN system, the Japanese people have more proactively participated in international cooperation of the United Nations. For instance, Sadako Ogata of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Yasushi Akashi as secretary-general and special representative in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, Hisashi Owada, Japan's permanent representative to the United Nations, have contributed to the UN system (Hook, 2001: 316).

Idealist and internationalist views took into account the policies and opinions of other countries which are supportive to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The first reference on Japan's SDF dispatch to the Persian Gulf was raised by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke (Dobson, 2003: 85). Likewise, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson emphasized that Japan could keep its pacifist identity like Sweden, even if Japan dispatched its SDF for peacekeeping operations. UN Under-Secretary-General Ronald Spiers urged Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama to join the UN-led peacekeeping operations. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney also offered Japan to share the Canada's expertise in the field of peacekeeping operations (Ibid: 87). These external opinions have been accepted by the Japanese idealists and internationalists not because of national interest but because of international interest. Indeed, Gareth Evans, head of the Australian Foreign and Trade Ministry, and the nations of ASEAN actually welcomed Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations (Ibid: 91). Similarly, the security policy of Germany might have encouraged Japanese internationalist viewpoint. Germany had changed its constitution more than 50 times in order to adapt to the changing international community and contribute to international and regional conflicts (Ishizuka, 2005: 70).
Japan's UN diplomacy, UN centrism or UN centered diplomacy can be one of the idealist and internationalist perspectives for UN peacekeeping operations. Although Japan's diplomacy has heavily depended upon the Japan-US bilateralism because of its security treaty, the Japanese idealists and internationalists regard participation in UNPKO as identical to Japan's UN centered diplomacy. This is because the objectives and principles of the United Nations are similar to those of the Preamble of the Japanese constitution (Ueki, 1993: 347, 349).

Although the so-called PKO debate in Japan was originally caused by the external stimulation due to the 1991 Gulf War, Japan's contribution to UNPKO is based on the spirit of international cooperation and international pacifism described in the Preamble of the Japanese constitution. The shift from domestic pacifism to international pacifism in the early 1990s was significant in Japan's PKO policy in that it became a foundation for other SDF dispatch for international peace operations. Japan dispatched its peacekeepers to Cambodia (UNTAC) in September 1992, Angola (UNAVEM II) in September 1992, Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in May 1993, Zaire and Tanzania as part of the Rwanda mission (UNAMIR) in 1994, El Salvador (ONUSAL) in March 1994, and East Timor (UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMISET) in 1996 and 2002. Furthermore, Japan sent refugee relief units and airlifting units to Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 as international humanitarian relief operations (MOFA, 2005). In sum, Japan's contribution to these international peacekeeping activities was based on not only realist but also idealist and internationalist motivations.
The Implication of “Positive Pacifism” for Japan’s PKO Policy

As examined above, international relations theories elucidate Japan’s motivations for UNPKO. Yet, the peace research theory, especially the definition of peace advocated by Johan Galtung can be applicable to the analysis of Japan’s PKO policy. Considering terms, "passive and active pacifism", proposed by the Ozawa Committee (Tamamoto, 1997: 7) as well as the definition of "positive and negative peace" by Galtung, I would like to re-conceptualize normative framework of Japan's PKO policy by employing the terms "negative and positive pacifism." The concepts of negative and positive pacifism will clarify the shift in Japan's pacifism which took place in the early 1990s.

Japan's "negative pacifism" is based on Article 9 (renunciation of war and non-armament policy) which illegalizes threatening and use of force as well as possessing any kind of war potentiality. Japan's "negative pacifism" is related to its historical sakoku mentality and utopian pacifism which even denies the right to self-defense. Furthermore, this negative pacifism has been criticized as a selfish "one nation pacifism" (ikkoku heiwa syugi).

On the contrary, "positive pacifism" is based on the Preamble of the Japanese constitution (the right to peaceful coexistence and international pacifism) which considers peacekeeping policy to be an indispensable obligation as a member of the United Nations. Simply put, "negative pacifism" has a goal to attain "negative peace" (absence of direct violence or absence of weapons). On the other hand, "positive pacifism" aims to actualize "positive peace" (absence of structural violence and presence of the right to peaceful coexistence).

As Funabashi argued, Japan has to establish a new self-image to
get over the image of "economic giant and military dwarf" in the world where the nature of power has been changing. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean Japan should be changed radically (Funabashi, 1994: 11). "Positive pacifism" can be Japan's new foreign and security policy which will enhance Japan's attractiveness which will contribute to peaceful but influential diplomacy without coercion or payment. Accordingly, the "positive pacifism" policy will enable Japan to strengthen its "soft power", which was proposed by Joseph Nye Jr. (Nye, 2004: Preface, x). Soft power diplomacy of the Japanese government will have to compensate for other Asian countries where Japan invaded in the past (Ibid: 86). "Positive pacifism" diplomacy which values the right to peaceful coexistence for all the people in the world will be increasingly significant in relationships with other Asia-Pacific countries.

“Positive Pacifism” for Asia-Pacific and International Peace and Security

Although there has existed "anti-militarism" among the Asia-Pacific countries including Japan, some ASEAN members especially Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore showed strong support for Japan's contribution to international peacekeeping. In the post-UNTAC period, Japan's peacekeeping in the region of ASEAN states has become significant. Cambodian Premier Hun Sen said that even if Japan dispatches its SDF to UNTAC, no country would associate it with Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept which prevailed before and during the Pacific War. Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir and Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong appreciated the significance of Japan's contribution to UN
peacekeeping operations in May 1993. Meanwhile, China and South Korea initially showed suspicion about Japan's peacekeeping role in UNTAC. A Chinese official expressed the view that they were worried about not present but future conduct. In the meanwhile however, suspicion of South Korea weakened after Japan participated in UNTAC (Ishizuka, 2005: 82-83). Military transparency of the SDF contributes to the confidence building measure (CBM) and amicable relationship with Asia-Pacific states.

As well as positive pacifism policy, the preventive diplomacy, especially CBM in the Asia-Pacific region would be conducive to overcoming security dilemma and to facilitating reconciliation between Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries. Masatsugu Naya categorized fact-finding, analysis, CBM, and early warning as early prevention and peacemaking, preventive deployment, or arbitration as late prevention (Naya, 2003: 90). According to Naya, the United States can be a balancer in this area and it is significant to redefine the US-Japan bilateral security treaty for security of the Asia-Pacific area (Ibid: 100). Preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific would reduce the risk of conflict escalation in North Korea and Spratly Islands. In the Asia-Pacific area, the preventive diplomacy is not main or urgent issue at this point. These issues need to be dealt with in relation to CBM as the early preventive diplomacy among the Asia-Pacific states (Ibid: 107). Defense and Foreign Affairs officials of Japan and South Korea discussed the possibility of cooperation in peacekeeping operations, with joint training exercises and the mutual use of transport planes. CBM can be attainable through peacekeeping training. It has been suggested that a training center specifically for peacekeeping operations in the Asia-Pacific region should be established such as those in operation in the Nordic states, Canada and Ireland (Ishizuka,
The "Asia-Pacific PKO Training Center" would provide the Asia-Pacific states with CBM and will be helpful for Japan to resolve its historical problems with other Asian countries such as China or North and South Korea. The idea of the PKO Training Center in the Asia-Pacific can be facilitated by Japan's foreign and security policy based on positive pacifism.

Through utilizing its positive pacifist identity, Japan can take the initiative for harmonizing and integrating the regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific. Richard Coudenhove Kalergi, the so-called father of the European Community (EC), once mentioned that the "Atlantic civilization" of Europe and America was moving to a "Pacific civilization" and Japan could become part of the mainstream of the civilization. Likewise, Arnold J. Toynbee predicted the emergence of a Pacific civilization (Galtung and Ikeda, 1995: 35).

It is difficult to forecast that an Asia-Pacific civilization will be formed in the future, but at least, Japan needs to make efforts to harmonize the Asia-Pacific countries economically and politically. In order to enhance peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, an idea of establishing an "Asia-Pacific UN office" was raised (Ikeda, 2005). Japan will be able to financially and academically support the establishment of the Asia-Pacific UN office hand in hand with key UN supporters such as Australia and Canada.

In sum, the implication of "positive pacifism" is not only domestic but also regional, international, and civilizational. Japan has contributed to international peacekeeping operations based on "positive pacifism" of the Preamble (the right to peaceful coexistence and international pacifism). Japan needs to advocate positive pacifism and take leadership in the field of Asia-Pacific and international peace and security.
Conclusion

This paper has examined the development of Japan's PKO policy in relation to the shift in Japan's pacifism. It has substantiated the applicability of the concept of "positive pacifism" and theories of international relations to the study of Japan's PKO policy. The paper began with the review of Japan's constitutional pacifism and anti-militarism and clarified the dilemmatic relationship between Article 9 and the SDF.

In contrast to Japan's security policy during the Cold War, the paper highlighted the development of Japan's PKO policy in response to the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the following 1991 Gulf War. Japan's financial contribution of US$ 13 billion for the multinational forces was not appreciated by the Kuwaiti government in an explicit manner and Japan's response was criticized as a "non-bloodshed" policy. The Gulf War trauma made the Japanese policymakers reconsider the conventional security policy especially overseas dispatch of the SDF. The Japanese government's first attempt to pass the 1990 UN Peace Cooperation Bill resulted in failure, but the second bill was successful and enacted as the 1992 PKO Law. The shift in the security policy was meaningful considering the strong influence of deeply embedded anti-militarism. The factors for the shift were scrutinized in terms of realist, idealist and internationalist perspectives, and the paper analyzed that all these factors were influential.

In an attempt to explain the shift in Japanese pacifism during the PKO debate of the early 1990s, this paper employed the concept of "positive pacifism" based on the Preamble of the Japanese constitution. Japan's UN peacekeeping policy showed its possibility to stabilize Japan's security identity as a positive pacifist country. The positive
pacifist diplomacy will be effective in dealing with the historical problems among other Asian countries. In conclusion, Japan can advocate positive pacifism not only for UNPKO but also for attainment of "positive peace" in the Asia-Pacific and the world.

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(Notes)

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