In the preceding chapters, I have denied the generally accepted classification of value, i.e., truth, good, and beauty, and have replaced it with a new one, i.e., gain, good and beauty.

The value of gain is a relation-power which directly influences the whole life of an individual. Therefore, it may be termed as an individual value or a whole personal value. In contrast to this value, value of beauty can safely be termed as a sensory or sensual value, because it has direct influence on the sense organs but exerts only indirect influence on the whole life of the individual. Since the value of gain, the individual, whole personal value is the relation-power bearing on the life of an individual, i.e., a private-self, the relation-power bearing on the life of a society, a larger upper substance whose elements are these individuals may be termed as a collective social value in contrast to the value of gain, the individual, whole personal value.

1. Value of beauty—sensory value concerning the partial life [of an individual].
2. Value of gain—individual value concerning the whole life of an individual.

3. Value of good—social value concerning the collective life of a society.

The object which is burdened with the value of beauty stimulates the sense organs of a human being and does not relate to the whole life of an individual self and a society. In the sense organs it is evaluated according to one's reaction of feelings, such as pleasure or displeasure, and in the end is judged as beauty or ugliness. Therefore, it does not touch the safety of life directly.

In other words, the relation-power between object and subject, which is judged in the light of such categories as good-evil, gain-loss, beauty-ugliness, is recognized and classified in the names of each value not from the quality immanent in the object but from that of the judging subject, the evaluating subject which is influenced by the object. The greatness or smallness of value is judged according to the degree of the relation-power which is produced by the correlation between subject and object. It is then that praise or condemnation is made. Thus the concept of value of good, i.e., moral value, means the relationship of the quality to be weighed in the standard-balance of good or evil, and economic value or value of gain means that to be weighed in the standard-balance of gain or loss. Similarly, value of beauty, i.e., aesthetic value, means that to be weighed in the standard-balance of beauty or ugliness.

II

Value, be it good, beauty or gain, differs in accordance with the balance by which one weighs the relationship between an evaluated object and an evaluating subject. The balance or measure to weigh means an attitude of reaction wherein a subject is provoked and excited by an object. When an object is in
the state which is suitable for such simple adjectives as “beautiful” or “interesting”, a subject appreciates it in a calm and reposeful state, with no consideration for his survival, and therefore without being uneasy and cautious. Thus, he feels pleasure and if he thinks he can get it of his free will, he wants to obtain and control it. If he thinks that it is beyond his power and that it has magnificent and awe-inspiring power, he admires, adores, or obeys it. This relationship between object and us is called value of beauty.

If an object is suitable for such adjectives “useful”, “available”, “convenient” and “profitable”, a subject approaches it with somewhat stronger feelings than the above-mentioned ones, and intends to utilize it rather than appreciate it in ecstasy, and thus feels pleasure. This relationship between object and us is called value of gain.

If an object is enough to deserve the name of “good”, a subject loves and respects it in as far as it is not harmful to him. This relationship between object and society is called moral value.

An object, be it moral, aesthetic or economic, should be considered to have common elements in its quality. To summarize these elements, they are worthy of attracting people’s attention and are not mediocre and monotonous but many-faceted and unified. In other words, they are related to the prolongation and shortening of life and without them people will not come to be conscious of their value.

The appreciation and classification of moral, aesthetic and economical objects are made on the basis of the quality of the objects on the one hand and also on the standpoint of the evaluators on the other hand.

I believe that the difference between gain and good is not based on the difference in the quality of objects, but on the difference in the standard for evaluation, i.e., the subjective attitude which expresses a state of reaction toward the object.
Since the object of moral evaluation, be it good or evil, is limited to a man's intentional action, it may be presumed that the object of moral evaluation is distinguished from that of economic evaluation, be it gain or loss, on the basis of the difference in the quality of the objects, but this is not necessarily true. It may be more proper to say that the distinction of good-evil from gain-loss is made not on the basis of the difference of objects but on the difference in the standard for evaluation, i.e., in the subjective attitude which expresses a state of reaction toward the objects.

The reason is that, according to our familiar experience, a man's intentional action (apart from a man's unintentional action which appears like a natural phenomenon) is evaluated from various standpoints for evaluation and with different standards for evaluation.

In other words, an object which is evaluated as a personalistic action will sometimes be regarded as an object for moralistic or aesthetic criticism, according to the difference in the evaluating subjects and their standpoint, i.e., their class, position and circumstances that govern them.

For example, a drunken man's rude behavior is looked on as an amusing behavior and is ridiculed by children who have nothing to do with him or young girls and women who happen to pass by. Thus his behavior is criticized as if it were a comical play. However, those men of character who consider themselves somewhat responsible for the establishment of public morals and maintenance of strict discipline will not be satisfied with such contemptuous evaluation as amusing, but go further to feel moral chill and try to make him reflect on his behavior by reproving and admonishing him.

Furthermore, his relatives, friends and those who have direct concern with him will treat it with keen feelings of displeasure or pain as if it were their direct concern, and if it should happen to bring disgrace to their honor, or harm to their bodies, their attitude toward it will naturally change. In the end
they will evaluate it on the basis of the gain-loss judgment and will act intentionally, such as opposing, struggling with, succumbing to, defending against or escaping from it.

In this way an intentional behavior of the same person is either evaluated as moral behavior or is appreciated indifferently as an aesthetic fact according to the kind or standpoint of the evaluating subject. A quarrel between husband and wife can in no way be an object of calm and indifferent appreciation for themselves or for the family members who are directly related with them. However, this type of quarrel is treated by indifferent lookers-on only such an amusing fact as an aesthetic fact to gratify their curiosity like an unintentional behavior of the natural world, or else as a dispute which merely wastes their time. On some occasion, they do not decide which side is right or wrong but assume an indifferent attitude, making fun of the quarrel just for amusement. In this case, they appreciate it in an indifferent attitude which bears no direct relation on their lives, just as enjoy a work of art.

In conclusion, the difference in the kinds of value can be ascribed not to the difference in the quality of objects but to the difference of the reaction-attitude of the evaluating subject. Therefore, moral, aesthetic and economic values should be evaluated as being of the same quality, though they appear distinctly separate from each other and have independent and specific terms as if they had nothing in common. I believe that by the above-mentioned explanation the classification of values has already been clarified.

III

In his book "Sociology", Lester Ward wrote as follows: "Now the good is, at bottom, nothing else than agreeable sensation as it was developed for the preservation of life. Without it, man could never have come
into existence. This agreeable sensation, which early takes the form of pleasure, possesses every conceivable degree, not merely of intensity or pitch, but also of quality or timbre. It is in itself good. It is the good that we have sought for. All pleasure is not only good but right, if it results in no harm. But to result in harm is simply to derive of pleasure. In consequence of these degrees in the intensity and quality of pleasure, everything becomes relative, and morality is reduced to choosing among pleasures the one that is best. The best is the superlative of good, and the good is pleasure. So the best is the greatest pleasure. The ethical purpose is to secure the maximum absolute enjoyment."

Can pleasure be called good? Ward says, “All pleasure is not only good but right, if it results in no harm.” This means that all pleasures are not necessarily good and that there must be some pleasures which result in harm. These pleasures are not good.

Therefore, Ward affirms that there are some cases where pleasure is not identical with good. We have now the question, “What is that pleasure which is not good?” Since ancient times generally hedonism has not been approved as valid by ethics and it has been argued that it is impossible to establish a standard for good and evil permanently. It is true that almost all pleasures are accompanied by good deeds, but it is also an undoubted fact that all behaviors whose purpose is pleasure are not necessarily good. There are many evils among them and especially many crimes are caused by seeking pleasures. Probably those deeds which seek lower-grade pleasure are evil and those deeds which seek higher-grade pleasures are good. If Ward’s intention is this, the standard for good and evil remains undecided unless the grade of pleasures is settled as high or low. Therefore, if the standard for good and evil is related not only to the degree of pleasure but also to its quality, then it is very difficult to classify such qualities.